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‘Japan is not interesting’: thus the literary scholar Masao Miyoshi could, 
with a twist of irony, entitle an essay on his native country a decade and 
a half ago. The dramas that have since beset Japan might serve to qualify 
Miyoshi’s provocation. In 2011, the fifth most powerful earthquake ever 
recorded thrust parts of the archipelago four metres to the east and jolted 
the country back to the front pages. The accompanying tsunami towered 
forty feet high, killed twenty thousand, displaced 300,000, and ignited the 
worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. Capitalists hoped the destruction 
would be creative. When the waters cleared, the ldp was returned to power 
under the leadership of an unlikely innovator promising to jump-start the 
economy and revive the country’s animal spirits with bold inflationary 
measures. The Economist lost no time blazoning Abe on its cover, kitted out 
as Superman, punching the skies.
Economic crisis and opportunity have in the past prompted a number of 
leading journalists to move from broadsheet to octavo and assess the island 
nation. In 1989, Bill Emmott predicted in the incongruously titled The Sun 
Also Sets that Japan would continue to hold strong (a revised edition appeared 
within a year). The resulting doldrums encouraged Richard Katz to take 
the patient’s temperature a decade later in Japan: The System that Soured; 
again the diagnosis—only electoral reform could shake it awake—misread 
the symptoms. With Bending Adversity: Japan and the Art of Survival, David 
Pilling joins this group. A dozen years covering East Asia for the Financial 
Times have equipped him to update the tradition with another plotter of eco-
nomic diagnosis-cum-prescription, and he pays his dues to it. Written for 
a non-specialist Anglosphere audience, Pilling’s book is best read not just 
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as an example of the expanding genre of works by foreign correspondents 
stepping back to look at the societies where they have been posted, but also 
as an illustration of the ways in which Japan is changing in the neoliberal 
imaginary. In both respects, Pilling’s tone and method are distinctive.
Bending Adversity is framed by vivid descriptions of the tsunami and its 
aftermath. Pilling aims to take the disaster as a starting point for a broader 
inquiry into how Japan’s institutions and its people have dealt with com-
parable crises. The country’s modern history has been punctuated by 
abrupt changes of course in response to existential threats: the revolution-
from-above of the Meiji Restoration in the 1860s; the Blitzkrieg imperialist 
expansion of the 1930s and 40s; the breakneck growth that made it the 
world’s second largest economy in the 70s and 80s; the equally dramatic 
bursting of its property bubble after 1989, leaving it a world leader in zombie 
banks and deflationary stagnation, the ‘Japanese scenario’ a spectre haunt-
ing the post–2008 us and eu. Might the horrors of the tsunami and the 
nuclear meltdown at Fukushima—plus, Pilling slips in, the rise of China—
galvanize Japan’s leaders into a new leap forward? In successive chapters, he 
examines the ideology of Japan’s uniqueness, the history of the country from 
Meiji times to the Pacific War, the economic miracle of the post-war decades 
and the debacle of the nineties. He then considers the social and cultural 
effects of the decades of slow growth since, the ways in which it has been 
handled, the Koizumi years, Japan’s demographic prospects, the situation of 
women and youth, and its diplomatic isolation. An afterword asks whether 
Abe will seize the chance to ‘bend adversity’ once again.
In substance, the book divides into three kinds of writing: reiteration, 
rectification, and reportage. The chapters on the post-war economy rehearse 
stories familiar to anyone with a newspaper habit. These follow on much 
stronger sections untangling the nationalist imaginary—no other nation 
seems more unique or homogeneous than Japan—that ties up not merely 
right-wingers and people on the streets, but many analysts as well, who 
describe the country only in terms of how different it is to everywhere else 
in the world. This eye for diversity keeps the reportage fresh, which is at 
its best in the coverage of the tsunami. The volume opens with the country 
upended and its contents shaken out. Pilling tells the story of the Triple 
Disaster in gripping style through the fate of Rikuzentakata, an ancient 
town whose 70,000 seaside pines were regarded as one of the scenic 
beauties of Japan. They resisted the 9.0 earthquake that turned the earth 
to liquid with the force of 600 million Hiroshima bombs, but were no 
defence against the tsunami which followed half an hour later. A ghostly 
dust—remnants of collapsed buildings—preceded the wall of mud tower-
ing over ten yards high that reduced the settlement to a churning wreckage 
of homes, boats, schools, hospitals, and factories. Four minutes after the 
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tsunami reached shore, nothing remained, and one in twenty were dead: 
‘It was as if the man-made world had vomited up its innards. The things 
that were usually hidden—piping, electric cables, mattress stuffing, metal 
girders, underwear, electricity generators, wiring—were suddenly on full 
display, like secrets expelled from the intestines of modern living.’ The 
waves breached even the evacuation centres, sending escapees to the roof, 
from which they were swept away. The elderly drowned in their beds; 
the young, trying to rescue them. 
At the other end of the book we are shown, as in some darkly com-
edic action film, the government and the power company in charge of 
Fukushima bungling clean-up efforts, concealing information, and destroy-
ing what remains of public trust. While the president of tepco hides in 
his office, the Prime Minister orders what company officials are reluc-
tant to do—extinguish the plant but contain the meltdown by dumping 
seawater onto the reactors. But strong winds blow the loads dropped by 
helicopters back to sea. The ombudsman, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency, routinely covers up accidents and ignores warning signs from 
safety checks. The workers who carried these out did so under abysmal 
conditions—almost 90 per cent of the labour force at Fukushima Daiichi 
was sub-contracted, or sub-sub-contracted, with the day labourers carrying 
out the most health-threatening jobs. The government considered evacuat-
ing Tokyo, a metropolitan area home to 35 million, but would not release 
reports on the amount of radiation being leaked. A terrified public was not 
willing to let this slide, and more than 100,000 in the capital took to the 
streets in recurrent protests—a story barely covered in the Japanese media, 
notoriously more lapdog than watchdog. The catastrophe aroused both 
great solidarity, of which Pilling provides moving examples, and parochial 
discrimination. The people of Kyoto reject funerary honours for the souls of 
the dead in Rikuzentakata, fearing that, if burned, the wooden slats bearing 
their post-mortem names would contaminate the ancient capital. The rural 
mayor in Tohoku responds not with bitterness, but with the dignity and 
decorum that are rarely far from social interactions in Japan. 
In handling these dramatic events, Pilling’s anthropological sensibility, 
his gifts of empathy and observation, serve his journalism well. For the most 
part he eschews critical analysis of the sort offered by scholars such as Karel 
van Wolferen, Jeff Kingston, R. Taggart Murphy or Gavan McCormack. He 
opts instead for the role of a sympathetic listener, with a sharp ethnographic 
eye. Postmodern anthropologists would nod approvingly at his aim to por-
tray Japan ‘as I find it’ and ‘allow, wherever feasible, the Japanese to speak 
for themselves in all their diversity and noisy disagreement’. That meant 
taking the trouble to learn the language. Pilling is modest about his spoken 
command of it, but reading, which he succeeded in doing, is more difficult—
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the orthography, after all, combines three different writing systems and 
requires the mastery of at least two thousand characters, each pronounced 
in multiple ways, enough to daunt most reporters. Its polyvalence is there in 
his title, taken from a Japanese saying, which without prepositions is nicely 
ambiguous, carrying a hint of the object as agent: bending under adversity 
shows resilience as much as bending adversity suggests power. 
When, over the larger stretches of the book, he turns to social and eco-
nomic life in non-emergency conditions, the results are more ambiguous. 
Reporting the devastation of the tsunami, Pilling meets and talks with 
humble folk: a former artisan, a pair of women running a modest café, a 
hotel employee. But outside the disaster zone, the social horizon narrows. 
No workers, no farmers, no housewives—categories outside the ken of the 
pink paper. The ft’s business card opens many doors, but behind them 
are principally mirrors of its own readership—businessmen in cutting edge 
firms, media commentators, pop intellectuals, celebrity novelists, a couple 
of ngoers. They often express vivid and pungent opinions, which rarely 
coincide. Scholarship and the arts fare little better. One critical sociologist 
does feature: Yamada Masahiro, whose less than upbeat view of generational 
changes in Japan leaves Pilling uncomfortable. Literary critic Kato Norihiro, 
a regular in the New York Times, fails to convince him that zero growth 
doesn’t matter, but is more wistfully appealing. The breezy, bestselling PhD 
student Furuichi Noritoshi, explaining that Japanese youth have never had 
it so good, is a better bet. Murakami Haruki trots out his well-worn sayings 
from the lost generation, and a pulp novelist explains women’s bitter fate. 
As interviews go, none is dull or uninformative. But the resulting collage, 
which has neither up nor down, serves poorly as a roadmap of the country; it 
is a restricted one as well, with no unconventional features plotted. Korean-
origin Zainichi thinker Kang Sangjung, or a heterodox financial analyst like 
Mikuni Akio, should not have been beyond the bureau’s rolodex. Animé 
director Miyazaki Hayao might be more interesting to hear from than, yet 
again, an over-exposed Murakami.
Of course, no set of interviews could be completely representative of 
a country without becoming an encyclopedia. More significant is the way 
institutions drop out of the image of Japan conveyed by the collage of indi-
viduals. The bureaucracy, the university, the media, the unions, the parties, 
the employers’ federation, the yakuza—none are present, as if his subjects 
simply float in the space of their own opinions. Pilling speaks at length with 
Funabashi Yoichi, ‘an old friend’ and editor of the Asahi Shimbun, but says 
not a word about the newspaper’s role. In Bourdieu’s terms, these are people 
whose field has been removed, leaving only their habitus. But these bod-
ies, richly described, are personal only to the extent that they fit a stylized 
formula. Pilling doesn’t conduct his interviews in their homes, and only 
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occasionally in their offices. Instead, a café, bar, restaurant or hotel lobby are 
his preferred locations, with clothes and hair-styles minutely observed, as if 
every day were Saturday’s Lunch with the ft. Indeed, appearance and décor 
become obsessive anchor-points of his exchanges.
Fujiwara Masahiko: ‘We met in a Scandinavian-style restaurant in an 
airy and verdant valley a world away from the sweltering heat of Tokyo . . . In 
his early sixties and skinny, he appeared slightly gawky, dressed in a check 
shirt and casual white slacks. His greying hair sprouted hither and thither 
like untamed weeds.’ Murakami: ‘I once spent an afternoon with Murakami 
in a quiet restaurant called Tamasaka in the Aoyama district of Tokyo. The 
street, like so many in this city of secret neighbourhoods, had no pave-
ment save for a white painted line, and was flanked in parts by a large, 
uneven stone wall, which gave the surroundings an almost medieval fla-
vour’; ‘Murakami was wearing a deep blue suit and collarless shirt’. Kato: 
‘We met, suitably enough, in the lobby of a hotel built during the bubble 
years. It was a little too garish for its own good, and looked dated in a Japan 
where the understated is once more a sign of good taste’—‘he was wearing 
blue jeans and a purple shirt’. Shimotsubo Kumiko, product of a labour 
market that wastes the skills of highly educated women, still comes off as 
an ft lunch companion: ‘We met in the elegant tea room in the Imperial 
Hotel, a mosaic by Frank Lloyd Wright covering one wall.’ Shimotsubo was 
‘slim and fashionably dressed with a double string of pearls draped over her 
sweater’. Kirino Katsuo, pulp fiction author: ‘In the plush surroundings of 
the Fiorentina, an Italian café in the lobby of Tokyo’s Grand Hyatt Hotel, 
where large-scale works of modern art vied for attention with the beautiful 
people milling about.’ She was ‘dressed casually in a flowery top, slacks, 
and cork-soled shoes’—and so on. 
What is the effect on the arguments of the book? Pilling’s view of the 
‘lost decades’ is summed up in his title. Japan has not been a mere cap-
tive of adversity—economic stagnation and social disorientation—but has 
creatively adjusted to it. He does not assign responsibility for the late 80s 
bubble that followed the us Treasury’s currency intervention of 1985, the 
‘Plaza Accord’; it is seen as an ‘inevitable consequence’ of rapid growth. Yet 
he recognizes that the impact of its bursting in 1991 was nonetheless severe. 
Once deflation set in, the economy hovered in a ‘cryogenic state’ in which 
gdp, stock market, price of property and cost of living remained virtually 
motionless for two decades. A can of soda that cost £1 in 1990 carries the 
same price today; the gdp was ¥476 trillion in 1991, and two decades later 
had barely budged to ¥477 trillion. Storing savings in a refrigerator, Pilling 
remarks, made more sense than putting them in a bank, since it at least 
avoids fees—plus the crime rate is low. International criticism has been 
sharp, but faced with balance-sheet recessions and declines in household 
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consumption, Western countries have reached for the same set of medicines 
that Japan concocted: massive ‘quantitative easing’, rock-bottom interest 
rates, and stimulus packages mixing public works and tax cuts. The Ministry 
of Finance’s bank bailout of 1997—a monetary injection the same size as 
tarp a decade later, into an economy only a third as large as that of the 
us—merely kept things afloat. For now, the government has the deposits of 
spendthrift baby-boomers to rely on, but this cannot last forever. Those in 
their 30s save only 5 per cent of their paycheck, where their parents put away 
one-quarter. Public borrowing is now 230 per cent of gdp, and pumping 
fluids into a comatose patient cannot continue forever. 
Yet Japanese bonds remain a safe haven, even with ten-year yields below 
1 per cent. In real per capita income, Japan actually did slightly better than 
the uk and us over the 2002–12 decade—0.9 per cent annual growth, com-
pared to 0.8 per cent in the us and 0.7 per cent in the uk—if in part because 
a decline in population has dulled the impact of economic stagnation. More 
strikingly, many of the social ills facing other capitalist countries appear only 
in minor form in Japan. The streets are safe, social services have not yet 
been sliced, and the number of jobless has again fallen below five per cent 
of the labour force. The youth unemployment rate, now a ‘high’ eight per 
cent, is a figure most European countries can only dream of. If the West as 
a whole is now entering a period of drastically reduced growth, might not 
Japan prove a precursor whose ability to cope with it may become the envy 
of other societies? 
Pilling is careful to hedge his judgements with a well-connected report-
er’s string of ‘analysts said’ and ‘it appeared that’—assessment must come 
from the mouths of others. The quest for journalistic balance that tells us 
in one breath that Japan is ‘resilient and adaptive’ and in the next that ‘it 
has perhaps lost something of itself’ matches his use of interview mate-
rial only too well once he moves to social and demographic issues. In the 
place of argument or prescription, the reader gets a cacophony of random 
voices. The result is a general tendency to analytic flip-flopping, sampling 
without synthesis. On the one hand, labour market deregulation is closing 
the doors to lifetime employment, and the tradeoff for choice is insecurity. 
The landscape of youth is populated with ‘freeters’ in precarious work, the 
‘yutori generation’ for whom anything goes, the hikikomori who never leave 
the house, the ‘parasite singles’ who sponge off their parents well into their 
30s. But on the other: isn’t there something to be said for a life-style of ‘slow 
living’ after the postwar generation’s go-go work addiction? Doesn’t Furuichi 
see a welcome ‘consummatory society’ of carpe diem? Women endure mini-
mal childcare facilities, unequal pay—60 per cent of men’s—and workplace 
discrimination that ranks worse than the Philippines; very few enter 
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parliament or upper management. But isn’t a promising rebellion under 
way? Divorce is rising (the only direction to go from rock-bottom rates), and 
delayed marriage is now limiting their service as ‘baby-making machines’, 
as a Minister of Health recently described them. 
The demographic outlook may seem bad, but like much else in Bending 
Adversity, it’s not all that bad. An aging society is a symbol of wealth and 
solid medical care; low birthrates are an index of economic and educational 
development. Should youth who end up on limited-term contracts—now a 
whopping thirty per cent of all employment—enjoy a new autonomy or fear 
for their future? Straddling the fence prevents Pilling from putting a foot 
down even when it’s most obviously needed. Has inequality widened? ‘Not’, 
he assures us, ‘to the extent of many other nations.’ In fact, Japan now ranks 
behind only the us and Mexico in the oecd for the gap between rich and 
poor. By embedding its case within global trends, Pilling blunts the gravity 
of the situation confronting the 20 million Japanese now living below the 
poverty line, in a country once fabled for a middle class that supposedly 
embraced 90 per cent of the population. 
His coverage of politics is another story. By temperament, Pilling appears 
to be rather unpolitical—not in the sense of having no politics, but of tak-
ing conventional wisdom so much for granted that politics is not of great 
concern to him. His interest lies elsewhere. What attracts him in any field 
are swashbuckling types who ignore naysayers to risk innovation and drive 
the country forward—Ito in the Meiji period, Morita of Sony in the post-war 
years, Mikitani of Rakuten in the new century. Thus, for him, political time 
begins in 2001 with the election of Koizumi Junichiro, the ‘samurai with a 
quiff’. Under his ‘extraordinary premiership’, Japan saw ‘a mini-growth and 
productivity boom’ as he reined in bad loans, deregulated the labour market, 
cut public spending and in an epic battle—falling on this bloated piggybank 
with a butcher’s axe—pushed through legislation to privatize the postal sav-
ings system. ‘A rare blend of aplomb and conviction politics’, Koizumi was 
not just ‘the most exceptional prime minister’ in post-war history, whose 
ultimate resignation at the height of his power was ‘a heroic gesture’; looking 
back, he was in many ways ‘Japan’s Barack Obama’.
At the time Pilling was issuing this guff in Tokyo, his paper in London 
was hailing Blair in much the same fashion. But among neo-liberal 
politicians, Koizumi was not only one of the most overblown, but prob-
ably the most ineffective. Calling an election on a Post Office privatization 
bill—supposedly the key to the country’s future—he had not even read, 
his scheme was a dead letter as soon as he was gone. His legacy was little 
more than an increase in the country’s precariat. Lamely conceding that 
‘people appeared not to miss his policies’, Pilling insists that all the same, 
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‘there was nostalgia for the man.’ How much nostalgia was shown this 
year, when his return to the political scene was ignominiously routed in 
Tokyo’s municipal elections. 
For all that, Koizumi’s most important legacy goes largely unnoticed in 
the book. As China’s economy was poised to overtake Japan’s, he took every 
opportunity to embrace the us. To maudlin renditions of Elvis songs and 
macho bonding with Bush, Koizumi dispatched Japanese troops to help with 
the occupation of Iraq, sliding the Self Defense Forces of the country towards 
a more offensive posture, as the us had long urged. Under him, the protec-
torate in the Pacific clung ever more closely to its masters in Washington. 
Pilling takes no notice of this development. The omission is typical of a gen-
eral minimization in his analysis of America’s role in the post-war history 
of Japan. In his narrative, the us quietly exits after the Korean War, leaving 
scarcely a hint of the extraordinary relationship that left two central domains 
of Japan’s state sovereignty—overseas policy and security—in the hands of 
a foreign power. His claim that ‘political dysfunction’ arrived in the 1990s 
erases four decades of democratic deformity fashioned by the us in 1955 
when, in the face of Socialist Party victory, it re-engineered the political sys-
tem by slapping together the conservative Liberal and Democratic parties, 
with cia funds piped in to secure the rural vote (under malapportionment, 
worth up to six times its urban counterpart). The result was virtually unbro-
ken single-party rule for the next half century. 
Wartime memories continue to fester in a region where none of the 
countries that suffered the most under Japanese imperialism were invited 
to the table at San Francisco to sign the treaty written by Dulles, ending 
the war, a document whose final iteration left ambiguous, among its other 
deficiencies, the status of both the Daioyu/Senkaku and Dokudo/Takeshima 
islands, hotly contested today. Pilling laments the absence of a ‘Willy Brandt 
moment’—in 1970 the German Chancellor fell on his knees before a mon-
ument to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, a spectacularly hammy 
gesture—but this is little surprise in a country where neither the Socialist 
nor Communist parties, opponents of the Emperor’s wars, were allowed to 
touch power for long after 1955. When the jsp, after fifty years of exclu-
sion from office, issued the first formal apology for wartime aggression by 
a Japanese Prime Minister in 1994, it was by then an atrophied wisp of its 
former self, trading a moment to adorn a coalition government for a shovel 
to dig its own grave. Since then, similar statements have followed, with as 
much regularity as declarations undermining them. 
The unequal tradeoffs supporting this ‘special relationship’ would be 
questioned when factional warring in the ldp placed the newly formed 
Democratic Party of Japan, itself a weak patchwork of opposition groups, 
at the helm of state in 2009. Modeled on New Labour, the dpj offered a 
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muddy platform of family-friendly and pro-consumer policies, as ideologi-
cally vague as that of the ldp it displaced. Pilling quotes a political expert 
who likened the choice for voters to deciding between a Nissan and a Toyota. 
But the dpj’s leader Hatoyama Yukio—scion, like Koizumi, of a powerful 
political father—did personally stand out on one issue: relations with the 
us. Sending a 200-strong group to Beijing to help steer a path in what he 
saw as a multipolar rather than monopolar world, Hatoyama sought to cut 
the $4 billion annual ‘host nation support fee’ for the us military bases that 
cover twenty per cent of Okinawa, and block the transfer of Marines from 
Futenma to larger grounds at Henoko. Pilling spends barely four lines on 
this potential turning point in Japanese history. He says not a word about the 
virulent reaction in Washington—the pointed diplomatic snubs that turned 
to statements questioning the sanity of Japan’s elected leader—which, com-
bined with a relentless campaign by the Asahi, brought Hatoyama to heel, 
before casting him on the trash dump. If there was friction, Pilling suggests, 
it came from the ‘reckless’ stance of the discarded Premier. 
In the same vein, when the families of a trio of Japanese youngsters held 
hostage on a humanitarian mission in Iraq called for the withdrawal of the 
Self Defense Forces from the American occupation, he is not surprised that 
public opinion turned against them: ‘In their naivety, the three had stum-
bled on the hottest foreign policy issue of the day.’ Any questioning of us 
global power, however mild, is automatically a gaffe of which only a rube 
could be capable. In such reactions, Pilling reveals himself to be an intellec-
tual salaryman, as unthinking in fealty to the world outlook of his employer 
as those who belt out company songs on karaoke night. In his version: ‘At 
the Financial Times, I must especially thank Lionel Barber, our brilliant and 
dynamic editor’—‘I am fortunate indeed to have worked for such a fine news 
organization for so many years.’
Bending Adversity wraps up with an afterword on the second coming of 
Abe. No one expected that a leader who on his first outing, as Koizumi’s 
handpicked successor, had lasted less than a year, leaving office under the 
shadow of scandal, would be seen as the great new hope; but this time, 
Pilling assures us, he is armed with an ‘economic blunderbuss’. It is harder 
for him to be as enthusiastic about Abe as Koizumi since the former’s ver-
sion of Japanese nationalism is more radical, creating tensions with South 
Korea that are a headache for us attempts to coordinate a Pacific front to 
contain China. And his team can be remarkably tactless. Deputy Premier 
Aso Taro’s comment that Japan has much to learn from the deft way the 
Third Reich reformed the Weimar constitution was an embarrassment. But 
the boldness of Abe’s economic programme for swamping the country with 
cash to propel it out of deflation is ‘invigorating’. Abenomics, for Pilling, is 
essentially a test in social constructivism: if you believe in it, there will be 
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growth. The cocktail to revive Japan’s animal spirits combines a $110 billion 
spending package, printing money to reach two per cent inflation, and fur-
ther deregulation—all tried before, but never in so strong a measure. When 
the first two of these arrows were let loose, within six months the yen fell 
from ¥77 to about ¥100 to the dollar and the stock market rallied 65 per 
cent. Deflation made for low interest rates and easy debt service. Inflation 
will leave workers feeling poorer if wages do not also rise. Abe has pressed 
companies for pay hikes, but not gone so far as mandating an increase in 
the minimum wage; the 1 per cent increase by firms like Toyota will not 
match the blow from the sales tax doubled in April. 
Yet the boldest move may be still to come. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
though in the works for several years, is given little space in the book. For 
Abe, it’s not entirely new—he tried and failed to secure a trade pact with the 
us in his first term. But an expanded ‘everyone but China’ club has great 
political appeal for Keidanren and Washington. The prc has been Japan’s 
most important trading partner for over ten years, but as economic inter-
dependence thickens, chauvinist impulses sharpen. Abe’s ‘other selling 
point’, as Pilling puts it, is his firm stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. 
What he doesn’t discuss is the Prime Minister’s long-term political agenda. 
Pilling chides Abe over Yasukuni visits and revisionist remarks on wartime 
atrocities—Abe has even questioned whether the colonial expansion in the 
1930s and 40s should be termed an ‘invasion’—but he doesn’t discuss the 
far-reaching constitutional revisions the Prime Minister has sought since he 
first set foot in office. Altering nearly every article in the document, these 
would expand the scope for a state of emergency; transform the nominal Self 
Defence Force into a full-fledged army; and subordinate freedoms of speech, 
press and association to the maintenance of public order. Should this be a 
concern? Public support for such a radical revision may be lacking, but there 
are ways around it. Against widespread opposition, Abe recently handed 
down a reinterpretation of Article 9 that allows collective self-defence—
a move that Pilling, like the nationalists in Kasumigaseki, has lauded as 
‘inching closer’ to normality.  
In Pilling’s vision of Japan, the right is as absent as the left. Civil society, 
not political society, is the solution to the country’s problems. He praises 
the official report on the Fukushima disaster for not blaming anyone in par-
ticular, neither officials nor institutions, but rather attitudes. To lead Japan 
out of the doldrums, he offers his book as ‘a call to individual and collective 
action’. The twin crises of 1995—the great Kobe earthquake and the sarin 
gas attacks in the Tokyo subway—spurred a more activist engagement: why 
shouldn’t the Triple Disaster do so as well? The hope reflects the smoothed 
history that scraps postwar conflict for postwar growth. In a book with as 
broad a sweep as Pilling’s, many things must inevitably be left out, but all 
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the reader gets of historical challenges to the system is a dry ‘labour conflict 
was rife’. We hear nothing of the millions on the streets in the 1960 Ampo 
protests against the extension in perpetuity of the Security Treaty that has 
kept Japan a military protectorate of the us, rammed through in a snap 
midnight session with police in the Diet to quell the opposition. The mass 
mining strikes that took place later the same year and the next, when one in 
ten police were sent out to quell the ‘total war between labour and capital’, 
receive no word. Nor do the students who fought pitched battles against the 
police over Okinawa and Vietnam. Small wonder that civil society, even in its 
much tamer contemporary form, fascinates the author. 
What are its prospects today? ‘Popular opinion’, Pilling reports, ‘has 
turned sharply against nuclear power’, and a ‘significant area of progress’ has 
been the ‘public right to know’, in ‘an accelerating push for government dis-
closure’. Abe’s tenure has made short work of such claims. The anti-nuclear 
candidate for mayor of Tokyo was trounced by the ldp this winter, and a 
Government Secrets Act gagging the press as never before has sailed through 
the Diet. The sympathy with which Pilling writes about Japanese culture is 
obvious. But the country doesn’t need a softer version—more Pollyanna than 
booster—of Ezra Vogel, whose flattery once produced a local best-seller. 
